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ABSTRACT

The Social Construction of Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder (PMDD)
By
Raya Balabanova

Advisor: Elizabeth Wissinger, PhD

The creation of psychiatric diagnoses, otherwise known as psychiatric nosology, is a complex
endeavor, one involving a great deal of social construction. One diagnosis in particular,
premenstrual dysphoric disorder (PMDD), exemplifies the different factors that go into the creation
of psychiatric labels. After decades of research, activism, and debates, PMDD was included in the
diagnostic and statistical manual (DSM-5), which is widely used by clinicians in the U.S. This
thesis aims to describe how the symptoms described by PMDD caught the attention of the medical
profession and how PMDD was shaped into the diagnosis it is today. The introduction of my thesis
will provide a definition of PMDD and explain what makes it an interesting case study in
psychiatric nosology. The following section, chapter 2, will contemplate what constitutes a mental
disorder, while chapter 3 will explain why this question is important. Chapter 4 will give an
overview of the history of the PMDD diagnosis. Finally, chapter 5 will detail and critique the
debates for and against including the PMDD diagnosis in the DSM-5. The final chapter of my
thesis will conclude with some considerations for using the PMDD diagnosis today.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Psychiatric nosology refers to the social construction of psychiatric diagnostic labels.
Although some researchers and clinicians view psychiatric nosology as an objective description of
empirical phenomena, others point out that it involves a great deal of subjectivity. Primarily,
psychiatric nosology is guided by specific goal and competing interests, and involves not only
patients, but also clinicians, philosophers, activists, researchers, pharmaceutical companies, and
governmental organizations. Patients may benefit by getting treatment for their distress, health care
providers may benefit by helping their patients to improve symptoms, and pharmaceutical
companies may receive significant profits by offering treatments. However, receiving a psychiatric
diagnosis may also obscure the dynamics of a patient’s psyche, impede their sense of personal
responsibility, and cause various side effects associated with pharmacological treatment. As such,
there are many factors that go into the creation of a psychiatric diagnosis.
The creation of premenstrual dysphoric disorder (PMDD) perfectly encapsulates the
complexities of psychiatric nosology. PMDD is a psychiatric diagnosis in the DSM-5 that describes
severe emotional, cognitive, and physical symptoms experienced by certain women in the late-luteal phase
of their premenstrual cycle. Up to 9% of pre-menopausal women experience symptoms that are described by
PMDD (Endicott, 2000). Although the diagnostic category of PMDD was established some 70 years ago, it
wasn’t until the publication of the DSM-5 in 2013 that it became an official psychiatric diagnosis.

While there are many critiques directed towards the construction of the diagnostic category
of PMDD (e.g., Figert, 1995), the diagnosis describes real, and at times, debilitating symptoms that
are experienced by a substantial number of women (Endicott, 2000). Symptoms of PMDD include
affective lability, a markedly depressed or anxious mood, and irritability during the time period
coinciding with the late luteal phase of the menstrual cycle. In addition, physical symptoms such as
fatigue, breast tenderness, and bloating may also be present. These symptoms are cyclical and
1

subside with the onset of menses (Endicott, 2000). For a substantial amount of time during each
month, women experiencing symptoms of PMDD exhibit a significant impairment in their
professional and personal lives (Endicott, 2000; Heinmann, et al., 2014).
Due to the high degree of distress and disability associated with PMDD symptoms, many
clinicians and researchers support using this psychiatric label to diagnose and treat women. Such
proponents claim that PMDD can bring relief to a large number of women, allowing them to
understand the causes of their distress and impairment and to seek treatment for it (Endicott, 2000;
Rubinow, 2021). At the same time, the creation of the PMDD diagnosis was met with substantial
opposition, involving multiple claims. In the first place, opponents of the PMDD diagnosis claimed
that it isn’t a “real” disorder and is simply an exacerbation of another condition, such as depression,
anxiety, or post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Caplan, 2015). Others were concerned about the
implications of pathologizing “normal” premenstrual distress (Browne, 2014). Some feminist
critics even claimed that a PMDD diagnosis may disempower women by making them believe that
they were mentally ill even though their distress was related to stressful life circumstances, such as
poverty, violence, or oppression (Ali, Kaplan, and Fagnant, 2019).
These arguments were brought forth in lengthy deliberations that ultimately led the PMDD
diagnosis to be published in the DSM-5 in 2013. However, the decades leading up to this decision
demonstrate the complexities of establishing psychiatric diagnostic categories and illuminate the
degree of social construction that forms of backbone of modern psychology (Zachar and Kendler,
2014).
The goal of my thesis is to describe the process that led to the creation of PMDD and its
inclusion in the DSM-5. To this purpose, my thesis will contemplate the definition of mental
illness, review the consequences of giving and receiving a psychiatric diagnosis, detail the events
that lead to the creation of the PMDD diagnosis, and review the arguments for the inclusion and
2

exclusion of PMDD in the DSM-5. The latter section will also include a critique of the arguments
on both sides of the debate. In my thesis, I hope to demonstrate the complexities of psychiatric
nosology and to illuminate the high degree of social construction that goes into creating a
psychiatric diagnosis.
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Chapter 2: What Is a Mental Disorder?
The construction of psychiatric nosology — which includes psychiatric diagnoses, diagnostic
instruments, and diagnostic techniques — reflects specific goals. For instance, psychiatric
diagnoses can guide clinical intervention (e.g., by helping the clinician to choose an appropriate
treatment), in addition to research and policy. Psychiatric diagnosis can also affect certain functions
of the health-care system, such as the determination of resources allocation.
On the individual level, receiving a psychiatric diagnosis can help to provide a name, a
possible cause, and a course of treatment for the distress and confusion felt by patients, thus
legitimizing their suffering. Conversely, a psychiatric diagnosis may have negative consequences.
For instance, receiving a diagnostic label can obscure the internal dynamics of a suffering
individual. This can lead them to view their diagnosis as the root cause of their suffering — instead
of a description for a group of symptoms — which can impede their healing. Receiving a
psychiatric diagnosis can also confer the “sick role” on the individual (Parsons, 1951), which can
affect the extent to which a patient takes personal responsibility for their suffering. In addition, if
those who are assigned this role are exempt from social responsibilities, the impact on society may
be negative (Parsons, 1951). Finally, a psychiatric diagnosis can lead a patient to view themselves
as inherently deficient, which may stigmatize and alienate them from others.
In sum, whether the consequences are beneficial or harmful, a psychiatric diagnosis has
various significant effects on society and individuals. As such, it is crucial to decide which
thoughts, emotions, and behaviors belong to the category of “mental illness” and as such, are
deserving of a psychiatric diagnosis. By carefully considering this issue, the field of psychiatry can
create a distinction between a mental illness and other categories of thought, emotion, and behavior
which may be better described as normal deviance, criminal behavior, or biological illness.
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This chapter provides an overview of the arguments that attempt to describe the category of
“mental illness,” which includes thoughts, emotions, and behaviors that are either irrational,
distressing, or disabling. This chapter concludes with the definition of “mental illness” in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manuel of Mental Disorders (DSM-5), which is the most comprehensive
text of psychiatric diagnoses.
What Is a Mental Disorder?
There is a long-standing debate over whether psychiatric disorders are natural kinds or
social kinds (Zachar, 2015). The proponents of the natural kinds position claim that psychiatric
disorders exist in nature and that psychiatric diagnoses are attempts to describe them (Spiegel,
2014). Conversely, the proponents of the social kinds position claim that psychiatric disorders are
labels given to a group of symptoms with some similarities. According to this position, psychiatric
diagnoses do not exist in nature, but are socially constructed to fit a specific purpose (Hacking,
1995; Szasz, 1997; Zachar, 2015).
The proponents of this position further claim that what is viewed as a mental illness
changes across time and place. For instance, while homosexuality was once considered deviant
behavior worthy of a diagnosis, it is no longer such. Differences in views on mental illness can also
be observed across cultures (Watters, 2010). For instance, in some Eastern European cultures,
many do not view depressive symptoms as constituting a mental illness (Nersessova, Jurcik, and
Hulsey, 2019).
Another argument made by the social kinds theorists is that psychiatric diagnoses create
what they aim to describe (Hacking, 1995). In other words, by assigning someone a psychiatric
diagnosis, clinicians can influence someone’s thoughts, emotion, and behaviors in a way that
would more closely align with their diagnosis. Some social kinds theorists have even accused
psychiatry of medicalizing the human experience (Ali, Caplan, and Fagnant, 2010). For instance,
5

some scholars and practitioners view depressive symptoms as a normal response to stressful life
events, such as poverty or abuse (Browne, 2014; Caplan, 2015). According to this view, depressive
symptoms are not signs of a mental illness, but a healthy human response.
Despite these criticisms, The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5), which is
informally called “the Bible of Psychiatry,” contains some 400 distinct mental disorders with
varying symptoms, etiologies, and treatments (Spiegel, 2004). Periodically, the DSM-5 adds new
conditions and removes old ones. What determines which psychiatric diagnoses are included or
excluded from the test rests on one question: What is a mental disorder?
One way to answer this question is to identify the characteristics of a mental disorder, or
criteria that are necessary and sufficient to make certain thoughts, emotions, and behaviors
deserving of a psychiatric diagnosis. While there are currently no definitive criteria that a
psychiatric diagnosis must meet, the following section offers an overview of the characteristics that
philosophers, psychiatrists, and psychologists agree constitutes a mental illness.
The Characteristics of a Mental Illness
Irrationality
The characteristic of “irrationality” has been linked to the emphasis on logic, reason, and
psychic unity that predominated during the Age of Enlightenment. This time period is also viewed
as having laid the foundation for modern-day psychiatric categories with rigid criteria and arbitrary
boundaries (Edwards, 1981). In contrast to Enlightenment-era values, “irrationality” is viewed as
the deviation from normal patterns of thought, feeling, and cognition. It can be defined as
disordered thought, failure to adjust beliefs in response to new evidence, and inconsistencies
between thoughts and actions (Edwards, 1981). Irrationality is associated with irresponsibility, as
those who are deemed irrational are also viewed as not being able to act in a “responsible” way
towards others (Edwards, 1981).
6

Critics of the “irrationality” criterion state that it gives psychiatrists free rein to decide
society’s values (Szasz, 1997). By turning “irrationality” into a disorder, behaviors such as meansend reasoning, empirically-supported beliefs, clear thought, and fair mindedness are viewed as the
standards to which one should adhere.
The DSM-5 does not currently list “irrationality” in its definition of mental illness.
However, the manual describes various disorders as involving deviations from rationality. For
instance, one of the diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia is “grossly disorganized behavior”
(Tandon, 2014). Likewise, the diagnostic criteria for borderline personality disorder (BPD) include
“affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood” (Biskin and Paris, 2012). As such, while
it is not explicitly stated in the DSM-5, rationality plays a role in what constitutes a mental illness.
Finally, the irrationality standard is used in the legal field and its definition of mental
disorder. For instance, assessment of criminal responsibility, fitness to stand trial, and the capacity
to undertake binding contracts are cast in terms of the defendant’s ability to “know” and
“understand” (Adshead, 2008).
Distress
In most cases, distress is synonymous with functional impairment. The DSM-V criteria for
most mood disorders disorders, personality disorders, and learning disorders require the presence
of either functional impairment or “clinically significant distress” (O'Connor, et al., 2009).
Aside from functional impairment, distress can also be viewed in the subjective sense as an
emotional state. As such, according to this criterion, a mental illness must cause distress to the
individual. Some argue that distress is a temporary state that is related to specific stressors (Caplan,
2015). When these stressors disappear, so does the distress (Caplan, 2015). As a counterargument,
those who propose distress as a criterion say that it is in excess of what is appropriate and persists
after the stressor is removed. For instance, someone who is diagnosed with an anxiety disorder may
7

have developed symptoms as a response to a stressor. However, the disorder (in many cases) will
persist long after the initial stressor has been removed.
One argument against the distress criterion is that this subjective emotional state may not
result from the condition itself, but rather, the experience of being diagnosed with it (Szasz, 1997).
Namely, the stigma and discrimination that follow receiving a psychiatric diagnosis may lead to
distress in the patient. Aside from external factors, an individual’s perceptions of their condition
may also play a role in how much distress they experience. A psychiatric diagnosis — by definition
— is negative. It is not viewed as an advantage, but rather, as something harmful that must be
eradicated. By focusing on the negative aspects of their diagnosis, individuals may increase their
likelihood of experiencing distress (Usher, Perz, and May, 2014).
Disability
In the DSM-5, some disorders are characterized as disabling. In many cases, mood
disorders, personality disorders, and learning disorders prevent the individual from performing in
their full capacity or as well as their peers. While this criterion is mostly applied to the professional
context, it can also affect an individual’s personal life.
Disabilities are often dependent on context, which includes an individual’s physical and
social arrangements. Similar to physical disabilities, disabilities caused by a psychiatric disorder
place a limit on an individual’s ability to participate in certain activities of daily living and may
require accommodations. However, the analogy between physical and psychiatric disability is not
complete because accommodating those with a psychiatric disorder is not always possible.
Let us consider, for example, disability caused by paralysis of the limbs. In this case, the
individual may be accommodated in certain contexts, such as public buildings, by the installation
of wheelchair ramps. In a similar way, individuals with certain psychiatric disorders, such as
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), may be accommodated in order to bridge the gap
8

between their outcomes and those of others. For example, it is a common practice for universities
to grant extra time on exams to those diagnosed with ADHD. However, in the cases of various
other psychiatric disorders, such as major depressive disorder (MDD), accommodations are not
always possible. If an individual experiences symptoms such as apathy, which interfere with their
ability to perform in a professional context, then it may not be possible to grant them
accommodations. For instance, a search on accommodations for MDD on the NCBI database did
not reveal any results.
A further critique of the disability criterion in mental illness is that it is not value-free.
Indeed, it refers to an ability of an individual to perform a given task in a social context. If they are
not able to do so according that meets societal standards, then they are considered to be disabled,
which which holds a necessarily negative connotation. Last, this criterion includes an arbitrary
reference class to which others must measur and fails to make a distinction between something that
is a disorder and something that is a mere difference in ability.
How Mental Disorder Is Defined in the DSM-5
The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-5) is
extremely influential in modern psychiatry. Since its introduction in 1957, the DSM and its
subsequent editions have been the predominant diagnostic instruments in psychiatry (Spiegel,
2004).
The classifications laid out by the DSM-5 adhere to a classic disease model. In it, each
disease is a discretely bounded entity that is made up of symptom clusters. (Zachar and Kenlder,
2014) According to this model, symptoms emanate from underlying biological processes. While
the DSM-5 recognizes that mental illness is caused not solely by an individual’s biology, but from
a complex interaction of biological, behavioral, psychosocial, and cultural factors. Nonetheless, the
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DSM-5 continues to make the analogy of psychiatric disorders to physical disease (Caplan, 2013).
This analogy has been challenged on various grounds.
In the first place, to accept the parallel of psychiatric disorders and physical disease, we
must accept the assumption that psychiatric disorders can be reduced to a common biological
cause. However, there is no evidence to suggest that a given psychiatric disorder stems from the
same factor or interaction of various factors (Aftab, 2019; Ali, Caplan, and Fagnant, 2010). One
popular biological explanation for mental illness is genetics. However, while disorders such as
depression are said to be about 30% hereditary, no single gene (or cluster of genes) has been
identified in their etiology (Lohoff, 2010). Instead, researchers suggest that inherited genes exist in
small familiar clusters (Lohoff, 2010). This is analogous to saying that mental illness “runs in the
family,” which means that it can also be explained by upbringing. What’s more, many symptoms
that are said to make up certain psychiatric disorders have a strong environmental component
(Rutter, 2005), which further casts doubt on the hypothesis that disorders have a biological cause.
Another critique of the parallel between psychiatric disorder and biological disease is that
the conditions listed in the text are not discretely bounded, but continuous with normal states
(Szasz, 1997). In other words, the thoughts, emotions, and behaviors that are considered disordered
may represent the extremes of normal distributions of traits in the general population. By assigning
certain thoughts, emotions, and behaviors the label of mental disorder, the field of psychiatry may
create a system of values in which simple deviations from the norm are considered dysfunctional
(Szasz, 1997).
Conclusion
The construction of psychiatric nosology is important for guiding clinical intervention,
clinical research, and public policy. However, assigning some a psychiatric diagnosis may also
have negative effects, such as objectification, stigmatization, and a reduced sense of personal
10

responsibility. This makes it important to decide which thoughts, emotions, and behaviors belong
to the category of mental illness — and which do not.
While there is significant debate over what constitutes a mental illness, some criteria
include irrationality, distress, and disability. However, I argue that just because some personal
attributes are irrational, distressing, and disabling, this does not necessarily mean they are worthy
of the “mental illness” label. In addition, what it means for something to be irrational, distressing,
and disabling is up to interpretation. As such, it is difficult to something to be considered a
psychiatric disorder based on criteria alone. Rather, I argue that clinicians and researchers should
adopt a more practical view of psychiatric disorders, viewing them as part objective phenomena
and part social constructions that are shaped by those attempting to describe them. I further argue
that when researchers and clinicians attempt to describe mental disorders — and, as such, assign
them a certain value — they should contemplate what purpose it serves and whether this purpose
benefits society.
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Chapter 3: The Consequences of Receiving a Psychiatric Diagnosis
When clinicians and researchers “create” a psychiatric diagnosis, the effects may be wideranging. Psychiatric nosology has many implications for the field of psychology, the health care
system, and the individual patient. The latter is especially important as a psychiatric diagnosis can
dramatically alter the life of the patient — for better or for worse.
A psychiatric diagnosis can give a name to the suffering that a patient may experience,
provide a possible explanation for the cause of their distress and a host of possible solutions, and
legitimize the individual’s distress by assigning them what is a socially agreed-upon sick role. A
psychiatric diagnosis may also be harmful. Telling someone that they are mentally ill may preclude
them from taking personal responsibility for what may be the cause of their suffering. Furthermore,
a psychiatric label may also obscure the internal dynamics that may give rise to distress, thus
precluding the individual from uncovering the root cause of their condition. Last, a psychiatric
diagnosis may lead to stigmatization, whether by the self or by others.
If a psychiatric diagnosis is combined with pharmaceutical treatment, then it can have a
host of effects on the body and the brain. For instance, amphetamine treatment has been linked to
slowing height and weight growth in some children (Goldman, 2010). This chapter will argue that
the reason the debate over psychiatric nosology is important is due to the effect that a psychiatric
diagnosis can have on the individual. In doing so, it will provide an overview of the beneficial and
the harmful effects of a psychiatric diagnosis.

The Harmful Effects of a Psychiatric Diagnosis
The Medicalization of the Human Condition
In the past, we came to understand the human mind through a variety of sources, such as
great works of literature, philosophy, religion, and scientific investigations. The large lexicon of the
12

English language — or any language, for that matter — could be drawn upon to explain the human
psyche. Currently, clinicians, particularly those in the mental health field, largely view the human
experience through the lens of the DSM-5 with highly-abstract language that borrows its concepts
from medicine (Aftab, 2019; Caplan, 2015; Kirmayer, 2005; Schaffner and Tabb, 2014).
There are several ways the DSM-5 medicalizes the human condition. In the first place, it
may medicalize distress, which is a normal part of the human experience. For example, what is
described as depression is not viewed in its complexity, encompassing emotions such as
hopelessness, despair, grief, anguish, sorrow, etc. and arising from events such as death,
heartbreak, disability, oppression, etc. Instead, it is a simply a list of symptoms that someone must
exhibit in order to be diagnosed (Tolentino and Schmidt, 2018). Furthermore, an emotional state
that fits a psychiatric diagnosis, with its negative connotations, insinuates that there is something
wrong with the individual for experiencing it.
Another aspect of the human condition medicalized by the DSM-5 are deviations in human
thought and behavior (Szasz, 1997). Prior to the influence of the DSM-5, such deviations —
whether “positive” or “negative” — were viewed in humanistic terms (Spiegel, 2004). As an
example, those who may be diagnosed with attention deficit attention disorder (ADHD) could also
be described in humanistic terms as being disorganized, careless, restless, forgetful, or disinterested
(Tamimi, 2011). The behaviors of these individuals can further be described as “nonconformist” or
“unruly” (Tamimi, 2011). These traits could be temporary and manifest only in certain contexts, or
they could be related to patterns in an individual’s personality (Tamimi, 2011). However, in
psychiatry, ADHD is viewed as a disorder of the brain that is associated with functional
impairment. Assigning the behaviors associated with ADHD the label of “disorder” has a negative
connotation, one that implies that the diagnosed individual is dysfunctional (Tamimi, 2011).
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Self-Fulfilling Prophecy of a Psychiatric Diagnosis
In the field of medicine, a diagnosis serves to explain which disease is responsible for a
patient’s symptoms. According to the medical model, disease is an underlying pathology that gives
rise to symptoms (Aftab, 2019). However, there is a distinction between a disease and the
symptoms of a disease. Let us take the case of a patient being diagnosed with diabetes. The patient
may present to their doctor with symptoms such as excessive thirst, frequent urination, and blurred
vision. Their doctor may then order a series of diagnostic exams that measure blood sugar levels. If
the patient has blood sugar levels above a certain cutoff, then they will receive a diagnosis of
diabetes. Thus, the diagnosis will explain the underlying cause of their symptoms.
In contrast, a psychiatric diagnosis may not always explain the underlying cause of the
symptoms experienced by a patient. A psychiatric diagnosis may describe the symptoms, but it
cannot be traced to a single disfunction in the body’s structure or function. Of course, various
psychiatric disorders correspond to deviations in the brain’s physiology. For instance, neuroimaging studies show that individuals with anxiety disorders experience increased activation of the
amygdala in response to stressful stimuli (Holzschneider and Mullet, 2011). The amygdala is a
group of nuclei located in the brain’s medial temporal lobe and is involved in various cognitive and
emotional processes, which includes fear conditioning (Holzschneider and Mulert, 2011). While
there is a correlation between a symptom that is experienced as a functional change in the brain,
there is no evidence that suggests a one-way relationship (Holzschneider and Mullet, 2011). In
other words, there is no evidence to suggest that the hyper-activation of the amygdala gives rise to
the symptoms that are described by an anxiety disorder diagnosis. It is possible that physiological
brain changes occur in response to anxious thoughts and behaviors. It is also possible that there is a
feedback loop between the psychological and physiological correlates of an anxiety disorder
diagnosis. However, there is no test — akin to the one used in making a diabetes diagnosis — that
14

can explain why an individual experiences symptoms of anxiety. Arguably, being diagnosed with
an anxiety disorder is akin to desiring the symptoms that the patient presents with.
Despite the lack of evidence for a biological basis of mental disorder, some modern
psychiatric discourse, such as that found in the DSM-5, describes mental illness as arising from
brain abnormalities (Aftab, 2019). One popular explanation is the chemical imbalance hypothesis,
according to which certain psychological disorders are caused by a deficiency in neurotransmitters,
such as dopamine or serotonin (Moncrieff, et al., 2022. This theory has been propagated in the case
of depression, which is described as a deficiency in serotonin that must be corrected by raising
brain serotonin levels with drugs (Moncrieff, et al., 2022). However, there is no conclusive
evidence to support that depression is caused by a deficiency in neurotransmitters. While some
studies have found low levels of serotonin in depressed individuals (Parsey, et al., 2006), other
studies have not found any difference between those who are depressed and not depressed
(Moncrieff, et al., 2022). Other studies have found elevated serotonin levels in depressed patients
(Reivich, et al., 2004).
Nonetheless, the discourse used to describe mental disorders is based on the assumption
that symptoms are caused by an imbalance in neurotransmitters, which is something that happens
to the individual and is out of their control. This is problematic because the patient may begin to
view their symptoms as stemming from a biological cause, thus discrediting other explanations for
their condition (Kirmayer, 2005). Furthermore, the individual may begin to act more in accordance
with the biological view of the disorder, turning their diagnosis into a self-fulfilling prophecy
(Hacking, 1995).
The Illusion of Free Will
The chemical imbalance theory espoused by many psychiatrists may warp many people’s
conception of free will, which is the capacity of people to choose their course of action. This choice
15

is not confined to tangible actions, but can also influence one’s attitude, train of thought, or
emotional state. In sum, free will is the ability to decide not only what one will do, but what they
will be. This means that if an individual is suffering, then they can take self-directed action to
alleviate their suffering.
Let us take the example of someone who has symptoms of depression. Upon recognizing
their symptoms, the individual can take actions to, for instance, improve their life’s circumstances.
Believing in one’s free will is important as stronger belief in free will is associated with higher
work performance, increased helping behavior, better self-control, and less conformity (Moreirade-Oliveira, et al., 2021). However, as according to the narrative of modern psychiatry, the root if
distress lies in a brain abnormality, then individuals may feel powerless in their face of their
suffering. Instead, they may feel that they are driven by an involuntary biological process which
controls their thoughts and behaviors. In some cases, this can lead a diagnosed patient to forego
personality responsibility for their distress. However, at least in some cases, people have the free
will to direct their thoughts and actions. While this may not feel like the case for, for example,
those with intruding thoughts that characterize an anxiety disorder, the fact that people are able to
direct their attention calls into question the hard determinism of modern psychiatry.
The Adverse Side Effects of Psychotropic Medication
Pharmaceutical companies have been accused of promoting the biological model of mental
disorders, while fabricating the purported benefits of psychotropic drugs and downplaying their
adverse effects (Caplan, 2015). Some clinicians have even argued that psychotropic drugs can
worsen treatment outcomes (Read and Moncrieff, 2022).
Let us take the case of depression to examine why this may be the case. Prior to the 1960s,
patients with severe depression were not treated with antidepressants, as they were not an option,
and were instead admitted to psychiatric hospitals. Patients admitted to psychiatric hospitals with
16

depression experienced an 80% recovery rate within 10 months without pharmacological treatment
(Whitaker, 2010). Furthermore, studies on patients before antidepressants show that more than half
of those admitted to psychiatric hospitals never experienced another depressive episode (Whitaker,
2010). However, with early use of antidepressants, clinicians began to notice an increased rate of
relapse in severely depressed patients with a shortening of intervals between episodes (Whitaker,
2010). Current studies show that antidepressants can lead to dependence, in addition to a host
cognitive, emotional, and physical side effects (Gotsche, 2016).
Antipsychotics may also cause severe side effects (Whitaker, 2010). Long-term use of
antipsychotics is associated with significant physical and psychological changes (Murray, et al,
2010). Some studies show that patients with schizophrenia die earlier than the rest of the
population, which may be partially explained by higher suicide rates, excessive use of tobacco and
other illicit drugs, and poor lifestyle factors (Correll, et al., 2022). However, antipsychotics may
also play a role in higher mortality rates amongst patients with schizophrenia. Antipsychotics may
negatively effect various organ systems, increasing a patient’s risk for developing cardiovascular
disease, diabetes, obesity, and high blood pressure, amongst others (Correll, Rubio, and Kaye,
2018). In addition, long-term use of antipsychotics is associated with a decrease in brain volume
(Correll, Rubio, and Kaye, 2018). While some clinicians find the risks of antipsychotics to be
outweighed by their benefits to the patient (Correll, et al., 2010), very few patients are warned
about the long-term effects that antipsychotics can have on their health (Whitaker, 2010).
The Positive Effects of a Psychiatric Diagnosis
Despite the numerous harmful effects that a psychiatric diagnosis may have on an
individual, there are some positive effects, as well. The positive effects of receiving a psychiatric
diagnosis include describing a cluster of symptoms in a coherent manner, reducing the uncertainty
some patients may feel about their distress, and connecting patients to mental health services.
17

Although some researchers and clinicians critique the practice of assigning psychiatric
labels (Tamimi, 2011), patients may nonetheless find comfort in having a name for their distress.
Even if it does not provide an insight into its etiology, knowing that a group of symptoms belong to
a recognized condition can offer patients hope that their suffering is legitimate. In many cases, a
psychiatric diagnosis can connect patients to evidence-based treatment, which can involve
medication, psychotherapy, lifestyle interventions, and various other therapies that are available for
the treatment of psychiatric disorders. In addition, a psychiatric diagnosis can help to provide
health insurance coverage for treatment, which would not be available if mental disorders were not
viewed as medical conditions. For these reasons, receiving a psychiatric diagnosis can have some
positive effects on the individual.
Conclusion
Deciding what does and does not constitute a psychiatric disorder is important because it
can have a variety of effects on society and on the individual, some of which may be harmful. By
medicalizing normal human distress or deviance, psychiatrists may be leading to objectification,
stigmatization, and lack of personal responsibility. In addition, psychotropic treatment for mental
disorders can contribute to multiple adverse outcomes. As such, I argue that careful thought must
be given to what is included in the DSM-5 as a psychiatric disorder.
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Chapter 4: The Creation of the PMDD Diagnosis
Although emotional and physical symptoms associated with a woman’s menstrual cycle
have long been noted, it wasn’t until the 20th century that premenstrual symptoms caught the
interest of medical professionals (Endicott, 2000). “Premenstrual tension syndrome” was first
described by R.T. Frank (1931) in an article titled “The Hormonal Causes of Premenstrual
Tension.” Frank noted the cyclical occurrence of distressing symptoms associated with the
menstrual cycle, which would disappear shortly after the onset of menses. Frank’s term was used
until approximately the 1950s, during which it was replaced by the term “premenstrual syndrome”
or PMS. In the 1970s, this construct caught the attention of Robert Spitzer, who is largely viewed
as the leading architect of the DSM revolution due to the standardization of mental health
diagnoses that he personally oversaw (Spiegel, 2004). Spitzer desired that all mental disorder
constructs of interest to psychiatrists and psychologists be considered for publication in the DSM.
Because the diagnosis of “premenstrual syndrome” was especially contentious, Spitzer established
a DSM-III-R workgroup dedicated specifically to this diagnostic category. The workgroup was
headed by Spitzer. It was up to the workgroup to provide evidence that would ultimately lead to the
inclusion of the diagnosis in DSM-III-R’s appendix.
A new diagnostic category was created, called “Late Luteal Phase Dysphoric Disorder”
(LLPDD), and proposed to the American Psychiatric Association in 1985 (Figert, 1995). The
diagnosis was quickly met with sustained opposition from within the American Psychiatric
Association, and from inside and outside the fields of psychiatry and psychology. Even within the
workgroup, many were opposed to creating the LLPDD diagnostic category for reasons ranging
from lack of research to limited diagnostic validity to implications for feminism (Spiegel, 2004).
The latter was especially important as it sparked as strong opposition movement that spanned
several decades. Indeed, a letter-writing campaign was initiated by a collation of feminist health
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professionals within and outside the APA (Figert, 1995). Due, in part, to this coalition, a long battle
ensued against the inclusion of this disorder in the DSM-III-R. This included years of closed-door
and public debates, oversight committees, and protests. It is difficult to say the extent to which the
opposition movement influenced the APA. However, on June 23, 1986, the APA voted to place
LLPDD in the appendix of the DSM-III-R under the heading “diagnosis in need of further study.”
(Figert, 1995). For this reason, LLPDD could not be used to make an official diagnosis. However,
it was official enough to be studied as a psychiatric condition that ultimately led to it becoming an
official diagnosis in 2013.
Spitzer was removed from his position as the chairperson of the DSM shortly after the
publication of the DSM-III-R. In his place, the more prudent Allen Frances was appointed
chairperson and tasked with revising the DSM-IV (Aftab, 2019; Spiegel, 2004). Once again, a
workgroup was assigned the diagnostic category of LLPDD. This time, their main task was to
compile evidence that would ultimately determine whether LLPDD would be moved to the main
section, kept in the appendix, or eliminated entirely from the DSM-IV. Ultimately, the APA
concluded that LLPDD should remain in the appendix upon the DSM-IV’s publication in 1994.
While the diagnostic criteria remained virtually the same between the DSM-III-R and the DSMIV, a change was made to the name of the diagnosis. The new term used was “Premenstrual
Dysphoric Disorder” (PMDD), which was done in order to avoid creating a false association
between the etiology of the disorder and normal hormonal changes of the luteal phase (Yonkers,
Shaughn-O’Brien, & Eriksson, 2008). Nonetheless, even this term was met with criticism, as it was
believed that the diagnostic label of PMDD implicated an aspect of a woman’s biology without a
proven causal link (Figert, 1999).
Between the publication of the DSM-IV in 1994 and the DSM-5 in 2013, a substantial
amount of research was published on the etiology, pathophysiology, and treatment of PMDD. As
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such, some psychiatrists postulate that the publication of PMDD in the main section of the DSM-5
was the case of simple scientific progress (Rubinow, 2021). However, scientific progress is not a
purely logical process. Indeed, there are social and political factors that underpin all scientific
progress (Figert, 1999; Schaffner and Tabb, 2014). In addition, the classification of disease
involves a substantial amount of social influence (Watters, 2010). Guided by these assumptions,
the following sections will examine the confluence of empirical, social, and political factors that
led to the inclusion of the PMDD diagnosis in the DSM-5.
This section will examine the work accomplished during the DSM-IV revision, which
provided the foundation for the inclusion of PMDD in DSM-5’s main section (Zachar and Kendler,
2014). The DSM-IV revision was divided into the Task Force and the Work Groups. The Task
Force was the DSM-IV leadership team, which was composed of 30 members. The Work Groups
varied in composition, but were assigned specific sections of the DSM-IV, such as mood disorders.
The LLPDD diagnosis, as it was known at the time, was assigned its own workgroup. This section
lists the factors that were cited for moving the diagnostic category to the main section, keeping it in
the appendix, or eliminating it from the DSM altogether.

Opposition to the LLPDD Diagnosis
Much of the opposition to the LLPDD diagnostic category came from outside of the
LLPDD Workgroup, the DSM, and the APA. One possible reason for this could be that much of
the opposition was amongst feminist psychologists, lawyers, journalists, and other advocates.
Nonetheless, within the LLPDD workgroup, Nada Stotland was staunchly opposed to the inclusion
of the LLPDD diagnosis in the DSM-IV. This section outlines the various arguments that were
brought forward as cause for eliminating the diagnosis entirely.
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One of the main critiques brought forward was that LLPDD was not a disorder in and of
itself, but rather, an exacerbation of a pre-existing condition (Ali, Caplan, & Figert, 2016). Some
scholars were concerned that moving LLPDD to the main section of the DSM-IV could potentially
increase the risk of a false positive diagnosis. Some feminist scholars took the argument further by
claiming that the symptoms consistent with LLPDD were “normal” reactions to external
circumstances such as oppression, poverty, or interpersonal violence (Caplan, 2015). However, by
being assigned the label of “mentally ill,” such women would view the problem as existing within
themselves than with outside of themselves. In addition, there was the critique brought forward that
LLPDD was not as tightly correlated with hormonal changes as would be necessary for LLPDD to
be considered a biological disorder. The combination of poor biological markers in addition to the
dependence on self-reported symptoms was cited as one of the reasons why LLPDD wasn’t a “real”
disorder.
Some critics of the LLPDD diagnostic category were able to grant the assumption that it
described real symptoms. However, certain individuals believed that it was not a psychiatric
condition. For instance, gynecologists claimed that LLPDD was a physiological condition that
should be diagnosed and treated by physicians. Accordingly, LLPDD could not be appropriately
classified as a psychiatric disorder — a necessary condition for it being included in the DSM-IV.
Other professionals in health care brought forth similar claims. For instance, “alternative” medicine
practitioners claimed that the disorder was caused by poor lifestyle factors. As such, it should be
treated with changes in diet and exercise, and with stress management techniques. The arguments
that LLPDD did not “belong” to the field of psychiatry influenced why some individuals wanted to
remove LLPDD from the DSM-IV.
Around the 1990s, the pharmaceutical industry began to take an interest in the diagnosis of
LLPDD. From the LLPDD workgroup, Sally Severino in particular was skeptical of the
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pharmaceutical industry and of those researchers who were being funded by it (Zachar & Kendler,
2014). One pharmaceutical corporation, Eli Lilly and Company, had shown an interest in the
LLPDD diagnosis shortly before the publication of the DSM-IV. This could be because their patent
for Prozac was set to expire in 1999. However, the company was granted approval by the Food and
Drug Administration to use Prozac in the treatment of LLPDD. This granted an extension to the
patent on Prozac, which was repackaged and rebranded Sarafem (Vargas-Cooper, 2012). While this
was not a significant argument that opponents of the LLPDD diagnosis used, it nonetheless fueled
the opposition to the diagnosis (Zachar & Kendler, 2014).
Feminist opposition to including the LLPDD in the DSM-IV came from both within and
outside the APA. Within the APA, the Committee on Women provided an especially powerful
voice and created a tactical campaign against moving LLPDD to the main section. Outside of the
APA, feminist psychologists, politicians, lawyers, and journalists led a strong campaign against
including the disorder in the DSM-IV.
The feminist critique of LLPDD was guided by several distinct claims. First is the claim
that the psychiatric label might incriminate all women as being subject to their “raging hormones”
(Figert, 1995). The second critique of the LLPDD diagnosis was that making this a psychiatric
diagnosis would increase the stigma associated with normal premenstrual changes, which may be
attributed to all women who menstruate (Caplan, 2015). As a consequence, women as a group
would experience negative social consequences. Certain feminists argued that the LLPDD
diagnosis would allow others to make the claim that women are emotionally unstable, which could
be backed up with the authoritative empirical evidence that was used by the LLPDD workgroup
(Brown, 2014; Caplan, 2015).
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How LLPDD/PMDD Became an Official Diagnosis
Within the LLPDD Work Group, certain individuals were most in line with Robert Spitzer’s
conception of psychiatric diagnostic categories. In other words, LLPDD was viewed as a “real”
entity that was simply being described by psychiatrists (Endicott, 2000; Spiegel, 2004). The
members of the LLPDD that were proposing moving the diagnosis to the main section of the DSMIV included Jean Endicott, Barbara Parry, Ellen Frank, and Michael First.
Within the LLPDD workgroup, there was a general agreement on the facts surrounding
LLPDD (Zachar and Kendler, 2014). The research compiled by the workgroup showed that
approximately 3-6% of women met the diagnostic criteria for LLPDD, which could not be
explained by another psychiatric condition. The distress experienced by women who met the
criteria for PMDD were cyclical, generally coinciding with the late luteal phase of the menstrual
cycle and subsiding within a few days of the onset of menses. The symptoms were consistent with
observable changes in hormones (Endicott, 2000). Last, most members of the workgroup agreed
that the women who met criteria for LLPDD experienced clinically significant distress and
impairment during the late luteal phase of their menstrual cycle. All of these reasons were
convincing enough for certain members of the workgroup to move LLPDD to the main section of
the DSM-IV, which would make it an official diagnosis.
Research provided by the pharmaceutical industry also played a role. During the revision of
the DSM-IV, there wasn’t a substantial amount of research available on the treatment of the
symptoms consistent with the LLPDD diagnosis. However, several promising studies showed the
efficacy of two treatment options in relieving symptoms: antidepressants and suppression of
ovulation (i.e., birth control). The antidepressants that were most studied were SSRIs, which could
be administered during the late luteal phase and stopped with the onset of menses. This treatment
approach was shown to be more effective than a placebo in controlling symptoms consistent with
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LLPDD (Endicott, 2000). Suppression of ovulation was also shown to be more effective than a
placebo. Women who met the diagnostic criteria for LLPDD ceased to experience significant
symptoms when taking birth control, becoming pregnant, or beginning menopause. Certain
members of the workgroup believed that moving LLPDD to the main section of the DSM-IV
would allow women to seek treatment for their distress.
The cultural milieu likewise played a role in the popularity of the LLPDD diagnosis.
Preceding the DSM revolution, the predominant philosophy in the field of psychiatry was
psychodynamic (Spiegel, 2004). However, the 1970s brought forward a new philosophy of
psychology, which was based on the assumption that mental disorders were caused by a chemical
imbalance in the brain. Because LLPDD was consistent with hormonal changes during the
menstrual cycle, which is also consistent with changes in the brain’s neurotransmitters, the LLPDD
diagnostic category was in line with the views of those who ascribed to the biomedical model.
Outside of the workgroup, the biomedical perspective was rapidly gaining dominance during the
time period when the DSM-IV was being revised. As such, this could be a possible reason why
certain members of the LLPDD workgroup supported moving the diagnosis to the main section of
the DSM-IV.
While scientific progress is often portrayed as a “logical” process free of any personal
values, the creation of diagnostic categories often tells a different story. Indeed, personally
experiencing the symptoms consistent with the LLPDD diagnosis could be a powerful factor in an
individual’s desire to treat other women thus afflicted. Certain members of the LLPDD workgroup
cited personal reasons for wanting to move LLPDD to the main section of the DSM-IV. For
instance, Barbara Parry recounted working with a psychiatric resident who suffered from what she
believed was LLPDD. According to Parry, the provider’s symptoms were so severe that they
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included psychosis. This is cited as one of the reasons that Parry was proposing moving the
LLPDD diagnosis to the main section of the DSM-IV (Zachar and Kendler, 2014).
Certain members of the LLPDD workgroup had a holistic view of the diagnosis. On the one
hand, they viewed the symptoms consistent with LLPDD as describing a real phenomenon which
caused distress in many women. On the other hand, they wanted to practice more caution before
making the LLPDD diagnosis “official,” as that could potentially lead to a variety of negative
consequences. As such, Allen Frances, Judith Gold, Sally Severino, and Harold Pincus were
proponents of keeping the LLPDD diagnostic category in the appendix of the DSM-IV.
The primary reason why certain members of the LLPDD workgroup wanted to keep the
diagnosis in the appendix was due to the need for more evidence. According to this view, there
wasn’t enough evidence to distinguish LLPDD as a distinct clinical entity, as opposed to an
exacerbation of a pre-existing condition. Indeed, research showed that women who met the criteria
for LLPDD were much more likely to meet the criteria for depression, anxiety, and PTSD
(Browne, 2014). In addition, some proponents of this view were concerned with the difficulty of
making an accurate diagnosis. Since there was no biological test to diagnose LLPDD, a psychiatrist
must rely on self-reported symptoms in order to make a diagnosis. It’s important to note that this
remains the case to this day. In addition, Allen Frances in particular was concerned with the
possible implications for the stigmatization of women’s premenstrual distress (Zachary & Kendler,
2014). All of these factors contributed to the increased caution surrounding moving LLPDD to the
main section of the DSM-IV and the desire to keep it in the appendix until more substantial
evidence could be compiled.
The Publication of the DSM-5
Premenstrual dysphoric disorder (PMDD) was moved to the main section when the DSM-5
was published in 2013. Unlike the publication of the DSM-III-R and the DSM-IV, which included
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the LLPDD diagnosis in the appendix, there was little opposition to moving PMDD to the main
section of the DSM-5. There are mainly two reasons that could explain why this was the case.
First, between 1994 and 2013, there was substantially more empirical evidence to support
PMDD as a distinct clinical entity. The new evidence used to support moving PMDD to the main
section of the DSM-5 included the prevalence of PMDD across cultures, the efficacy of SSRIs
when used during the late luteal phase, and improved methods for diagnosing PMDD (e.g.,
Comasco, Kopp, and Bixo, 2021). In addition, since the publication of the DSM-IV in 1994,
multiple biological theories that purport to explain the etiology of PMDD were developed.
Amongst these are the involvement of the neurotransmitter serotonin, reproductive hormones, and
endogenous opiates (Halbreich, 2003; Yonkers, Shaughn-O’Brien, and Eriksson, 2008). An
abundance of research was available that connected PMDD to the disregulation of the serotonergic
system. Aside from a depressive mood, low levels of serotonin have been linked to anxiety,
irritability, aggression, sensitivity to pain, and difficulty concentrating (Dimmock, Wyatt, Jones,
and O’Brien, 2000). Treatment studies also appear to support this hypothesis, with SSRIs showing
a rapid decrease in PMDD symptoms (Jackson, et al., 2015). Furthermore, research shows a link
between PMDD and reproductive hormones. Namely, an imbalance in the hormones estrogen and
progesterone have been linked to PMDD symptoms (Lovick, et al., 2017). More specifically, when
estrogen levels are too high in relation to progesterone, women are more likely to experience
symptoms of PMDD.
The second reason why the inclusion of the PMDD diagnosis in the DSM-5’s main section
was met with relatively little opposition could be because the individuals who were especially
vociferous during the publication of the DSM-III-R and DSM-IV were abstaining from the debate.
Because a significant amount of time had passed since the initial publication of the DSM-III-R,
many individuals who formed the initial opposition to the diagnosis had passed away. However,
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many others chose simply not to get involved yet another time due to the perception that standing
up to the APA was a futile endeavor (Caplan, 2013). In addition, some members of the DSM-5
revision expressed the belief that feminists of the 21st century were less worried about the
stigmatization of premenstrual distress and its consequences, such as workplace inequality
(Zachary and Kendler, 2014). Furthermore, the biomedical model of mental disorders became more
widely accepted by the public in the 21st century, which the PMDD diagnosis is largely based on.
All of these factors could explain why the inclusion of PMDD in the DSM-5’s main section was
met with relatively little opposition.
Conclusion
Though it may be appealing to describe the inclusion of the PMDD diagnosis in the DSM5’s main section as a case of simple scientific progress, social and political factors also played a
role. Aside from an increase in empirical evidence, several other factors contributed to PMDD
becoming an official diagnosis. Namely, the predominance of the biomedical model of mental
disorders, the lack of opposition from feminist advocates, and a shifting cultural milieu all
contributed PMDD becoming an official diagnosis that is used by clinicians and researchers today.
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Chapter 5: Is PMDD a Mental Illness? A Review and Critique of the Arguments
A certain degree of social construction is involved in the creation of psychiatric diagnoses.
Even if mental disorders are viewed as natural kinds, their description is an act of social
construction. Furthermore, choosing which disorder to include in the DSM-5 and which to exclude
is largely a social process which rests on the subjective interpretation of a given disorder.
The decision to include the PMDD diagnosis in the DSM-5 involved a lengthy debate, with
proponents and opponents of this decision bringing forth credible arguments. These arguments
demonstrate that the creation of a psychiatric nosology is a complex process that involves a great
deal of subjectivity. To demonstrate this, this section will provide an overview of the arguments for
and against the PMDD diagnosis, in addition to a critique of these arguments.

Arguments for Including the PMDD Diagnosis in the DSM-5
1. PMDD Is Based on Observable Physiological Changes
Robert Spitzer and Jean Endicott are amongst the psychiatrists who played a key role in
creating the PMDD diagnosis. They are known in the field of psychology as “biological
psychiatrists,” meaning that they believe that they are simply describing a natural phenomenon,
instead of shaping a social construct (Aftab, 2019; Spiegel, 2004). According to Endicott (2000),
the key characteristics of PMDD are clearly linked to the menstrual cycle. In addition, PMDD is
distinct from other mood disorders, such as depression and anxiety, and, in the absence of
treatment, exhibits a cyclical pattern that is stable over time (Endicott, 2000). Together, these
factors make PMDD a real biological entity that is simply described by psychiatrists (Zachar and
Kendler, 2014).
However, the biological view disregards the high degree of social construction in creating
the PMDD diagnosis. Arguably, the facts surrounding PMDD are not as clear as they are portrayed
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to be. For example, there is little consensus on when pre-menstrual symptoms begin (Caplan,
2015). In addition, the symptoms experienced by women with PMDD are not unique to them.
Women who do not menstruate and even men have been found to display symptoms of anger,
irritability, and sadness at equal rates (Browne, 2014; Usher, Perz, and May, 2014).
2. PMDD Is Tied to Biological Abnormalities
There is a split between conceptions of the physiology of PMDD. According to some
scholars, the physiology of PMDD is largely unknown (Halbreich, 1999). Other researchers believe
that there is biological component to PMDD, which involves the endocrine and the
neurotransmitter systems (Endicott, 2000). Those in the latter group cite studies that show that
PMDD coincides with hormonal changes (e.g., Lovick, et al., 2014). The symptoms associated
with these hormonal changes are cyclical, triggered by ovulation, and peak in the late-luteal phase,
resolving shortly after the onset of menstruation (Lovick, et al., 2014). These changes coincide
with different levels of sex hormones, particularly progesterone, which is thought to be responsible
for symptoms of PMDD (Lovick, et al., 2014). Symptoms of PMDD are absent from those who do
not menstruate, such as women without ovaries, which is used to further support the notion that
fluctuations in hormones are responsible for PMDD symptoms (Rapkin, 2013).
However, I argue that the above findings do not necessarily support that PMDD is a
mental disorder that stems from biological abnormalities. While PMDD is cyclical in nature,
coinciding with fluctuations in hormones, so is normal premenstrual distress (Caplan, 2015). All
women who menstruate experience changes in levels of sex hormones. For instance, one sex
hormone, progesterone, rises after ovulation and peaks in the late luteal phase. It is associated with
changes in mood, cognition, and physiology, and is present in all women who menstruate
(Halbreich, 2003). Currently, there is no evidence to support that women with PMDD have
different levels of progesterone and experience more severe symptoms as a result (Hantsoo and
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Epperson, 2015). A more plausible explanation is that women with PMDD are more sensitive to
hormonal changes, which is responsible for the symptoms that they exhibit (Hantsoo and Epperson,
2015).
Unlike sex hormones, there is some evidence that women with PMDD exhibit abnormalities
in certain neurotransmitter systems. For instance, women with PMDD have a lower quantity of
serotonin transporter receptors (Pearlstein and Steiner, 2008). PMDD symptoms can be further
provoked if a precursor of the serotonin molecule, tryptophan, is depleted (Pearlstein and Steiner,
2008). This is used by some scholars as an argument that PMDD is a mental illness tied to
biological abnormalities (Endicott, 2000). However, I argue that these findings do not necessarily
mean that women with PMDD possess a biological abnormality that causes a deficiency in
serotonin. It may be that women with PMDD experience increased emotional distress due to other
factors, which may lead to a decrease in their serotonin levels (Tafet, 2001).
3. PMDD Is Tied to Disability
If a certain degree of social constructionism is accepted, proponents of PMDD believe that
the diagnosis would benefit women by bringing recognition of its disabling nature and reducing the
stigma associated with it (Rubinow, 2021). This is based on the high degree of disability associated
with symptoms of PMDD, which can manifest in the work, school, or home context. For instance,
women with symptoms of PMDD have higher rates of absenteeism in school and the workplace
(Heinemann, et al., 2010). In addition, they experience impaired productivity during the time that
coincides with the late-luteal phase of the menstrual cycle and report cognitive difficulties, lowered
self-esteem, heightened sensitivity to their environment, and increased negative social interactions
(Heinemann, et al., 2010). Such impairments can impact overall work performance, opportunities
for advancement, and earnings over the lifetime (Heinemann, et al., 2010). Women with symptoms
of PMDD also experience a lower health-related quality of life, which is comparable to debilitating
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conditions such as arthritis (Yang, et al., 2008). As a result, PMDD is associated with higher
healthcare costs (Yang, et al., 2008). Researchers also found a significant impairment in
interpersonal relationships in women with PMDD, which is similar to that of women with clinical
depression (Klatzkin, et al., 2010).
Proponents of this argument claim that PMDD should be considered a disabling medical
condition because it would help women (Endicott, 2000). If it’s a disability, then it requires the
proper accommodations to be put into place, such as those outlined by the Americans With
Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). However, I contend that just
because a condition causes functional impairment, does not mean that it is a mental disorder. It is
possible to recognize the debilitating nature of PMDD symptoms without locating its cause in a
woman’s psyche. However, even if researchers and clinicians generally agree that that PMDD is
not a mental disorder that stem’s from a woman’s psyche, making this condition into a disability
can have negative consequences for women in their professional lives. Specifically, PMDD can be
used by a sexist society to justify unequal treatment of women in the workplace, such as barring
them access to opportunities traditionally reserved for men (e.g., surgeon, pilot).
4. PMDD Is Tied to Distress
PMDD is tied to distress in several ways. In the first place, the symptoms of PMDD, such
as anger, sadness, and irritability, can be experienced as distressing. I argue that this does not
necessarily have to be the case, as interpretation of emotions can play a role in how they are
experienced. For instance, viewing anger as a survival mechanism may make this emotion a
positive experience. However, in many cases, anger, sadness, and irritability are experienced as
negative emotions and as such, are distressing to the individual.
Some researchers and clinicians who support the PMDD diagnosis claim that the
physiological changes driven by the disorder lead to changes in mood that are described above
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(e.g., Endicott, 2000). This is supported by studies that show that women diagnosed with PMDD
report a largely negative experience during the pre-menstrual phase, which subsides immediately
after it is over (Usher and Perz, 2020). Some studies even show that women with symptoms of
PMDD are more likely to report suicidal ideation than those without symptoms of PMDD
(Wilkman, et al., 2020). Citing such studies, proponents of the PMDD diagnosis argue that the
subjective distress it causes women is enough to justify making it a mental disorder (Spiegel,
2004).
This argument has been criticized because it is likely that women don’t experience a high
degree of distress due to physiological changes. Instead, women may use the premenstrual time
period to express emotions they have been feeling all along but did not feel it was socially
acceptable to express (Caplan, 2015; Usher, Perz, and May, 2014). According to scholars such as
Caplan (2015), what is experienced as premenstrual distress could be understood as a reaction to
stressful life circumstances, which women may be more likely to experience. For instance, Cerrato
and Cifre (2018) found that women take on a disproportionate share of household chores, even in
households where both partners hold full-time jobs. This is perceived as a significant source of
stress amongst women (Cerrato and Cifre, 2018). Because of societal expectations that women put
the needs of others above their own, this distress is not expressed as a result of its true cause.
Instead, women can mistakenly attribute their anger, irritability, or sadness to pre-menstrual
changes (Figert, 1995; Usher, Perz, and May, 2014).
Some scholars also argue that women may learn to associate the premenstrual period with
negative changes and to exhibit certain psychosomatic symptoms as a result (Watters, 2010; Usher
and Perz, 2020). Psychosomatic illness may be a culture-bound syndrome that is found only in
certain nations. Anorexia nervosa is a well-known case of a culture-bound syndrome. This disorder
is found primarily in young, college-educated women in the U.S. and is characterized by extreme
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food restriction, distorted body image, and intense aversion to weight gain. However, this disorder
is largely absent in cultures that do not have exposure to the Western conception of anorexia
nervosa. For instance, Watters (2010) documents a doctor’s attempt to find a parallel between
anorexia nervosa and self-starvation amongst rural Chinese women. While his patients purposely
withhold food intake, they do not exhibit any of the other symptoms of U.S. anorexics, such as
body dysmorphia, perfectionism, and preoccupation with food intake.
One theory for this difference is that people who experience distressing emotions express
them in different ways. Much in the same way, symptoms of PMDD have not been observed in
rural Chinese women (Watters, 2010). As such, it is likely that women in the U.S. exhibit
symptoms of PMDD because they have learned to do so due to social conditioning. For instance,
Cosgrove and Riddle (2013) found that women often expect to suffer premenstrual symptoms. This
is not to say women express imagined emotions. However, it is possible that women with PMDD
experience distress due to other causes which manifests as symptoms of the so-called disorder.
Arguments Against Including the PMDD Diagnosis in the DSM-5
1. PMDD Is Not a Distinct Clinical Entity
One of the main critiques against the PMDD diagnosis is that it is not a disorder in and of
itself, but rather, an exacerbation of a pre-existing condition, such as anxiety or depression (Ali,
Caplan, & Figert, 2016). For instance, up to 70% of women who meet PMDD criteria have a
history of major depressive disorder (MDD) (Klatzkin, et al., 2010). According to this argument,
pre-existing symptoms may not be distressing enough to warrant seeking treatment during the
majority of the month. However, when coupled with normal pre-menstrual changes, pre-existing
symptoms may worsen to the point where they warrant intervention from a mental health provider.
Furthermore, some women may wish not to receive a certain psychiatric diagnosis for various
reasons, such as fear of stigmatization (Halbreich, 2003). Some researchers even noted that some
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women are more likely to prefer the diagnosis of PMDD than MDD, an anxiety disorder, or bipolar
disorder (BPD) (Halbreich, 2003).
Some feminist scholars took this argument even further by claiming that the symptoms
consistent with PMDD are what they claimed are “normal” reactions to stressful external
circumstances, such as oppression, poverty, or domestic violence (Caplan, 2015). A large portion
of women who meet criteria for PMDD also showed a history of trauma, which is associated with
increased affective lability, insomnia, loss of focus, agitation, and paranoia — remarkably similar
to symptoms of PMDD (Pilver, at al., 2011). Although some women may manage to go through
life without expressing their distress, the physical changes that accompany the pre-menstrual period
can make them especially difficult to manage, leading women to behave in ways that are described
by the PMDD diagnosis.
Last, some researchers noted that PMDD is not as tightly correlated with hormonal changes
as would be needed for the disorder to be “biological” (Browne, 2014). In addition, there aren’t
diagnostic instruments that can accurately test for PMDD (in contrast to, for instance, diabetes).
Instead, a diagnosis is largely based on self-reported symptoms which may not be fully accurate
(Browne, 2014).
If PMDD is not a distinct clinical entity, but rather, an exacerbation of a pre-existing mental
disorder or a reaction to stressful life events, then there are several consequences of being
diagnosed with it. In the first place, being treated for PMDD would, by definition, not get to the
root cause of the symptoms. If stress is actually the main problem, then being diagnosed with
PMDD can lead some women to view themselves as being mentally ill and the main issue as
existing within themselves — rather than with their environment. As such, a PMDD diagnosis may
not only be unhelpful, but harmful, as well.
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The question of whether PMDD is a distinct clinical entity was at the forefront of the
debates involving its inclusion in the DSM-5 (Zachar and Kendler, 2014). In order to be diagnosed
with PMDD, health care providers are instructed to screen patients for symptoms of depression or
anxiety disorders. That said, meeting the criteria for another diagnosis does not necessarily rule out
PMDD. While pre-existing may become worse during the pre-menstrual period, other symptoms
appear only during certain times and disappear with the onset of menstruation. In addition, while
many women with PMDD meet the criteria for another diagnosis, many others do not and
experience symptoms only during the premenstrual period (Klatzkin et al., 2010). As such, it is not
accurate to say that PMDD is only an exacerbation of pre-existing symptoms.
In addition, the claim that PMDD doesn’t closely correlate with hormonal changes isn’t
entirely true. While the onset of symptoms varies from woman to woman — occurring typically
within the third or fourth week of the menstrual cycle — the disappearance of symptoms is very
predictable, occurring within a day or two of the beginning of menstruation, as corroborated by
Halbreich (2003).
However, researchers and clinicians generally agree PMDD doesn’t directly result from
physiological changes, but rather, from psychological reactions to said changes (e.g., Comasco, et
al., 2021). Women with PMDD do not have abnormal hormone levels, but rather, show an
abnormal response to hormonal changes (Comasco et al., 2021). While there is little evidence to
explain this difference, a plausible explanation is that women with PMDD have an abnormal stress
response. This is in line with Caplan’s claim that women with PMDD are responding to stressful
life circumstances by expressing their symptoms (2015). However, not all women with PMDD
express symptoms in response to truly stressful events, nor do all women with PMDD have a
history of trauma. As such, PMDD may be a distinct clinical entity that — similarly to most
psychiatric conditions — interacts with a person’s environment.
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2. PMDD Is Not a Psychiatric Condition
Unlike many of the conditions listed in the DSM-5, PMDD presents with many somatic
symptoms that can are used as criteria for diagnosis. Symptoms such as joint or muscle aches,
breast tenderness, weight gain, and headaches are routinely used to make a diagnosis. In addition to
such diagnostic criteria, because PMDD is driven by hormonal fluctuations, some clinicians claim
that PMDD is not a true psychiatric condition (Browne, 2014). Many professions lay claim to the
symptoms described by PMDD, including physicians, gynecologists, and so-called alternative
medicine practitioners. The basis of such claims lies in PMDD correlating with certain nutritional
deficiencies and lifestyle factors, such as smoking, stress, and sleep deprivation (Scares, et al.,
2004). In treatment, patients respond fairly well to herbal supplements and pharmaceutical agents
that impact circulating sex hormone levels (Scares, et al., 2004). According to these claims,
PMDD, while a distinct clinical entity, is not a true psychiatric condition. As such, it should not be
included in the DSM-5 and should be treated by other health care providers — those who are not
psychologists or psychiatrists.
However, just because PMDD correlates with certain factors, does not mean that its
symptoms are caused by those factors. It’s possible that the reverse relationship is true: The
symptoms of PMDD lead some women to engage in certain behaviors, such as smoking (Choi and
Hamidovic, 2020). However, even if lifestyle plays a major role in the etiology of PMDD
symptoms, this does not prove that the disorder is purely physical. While the mind-body interaction
is one that is complex and not fully understood by health care providers, there is substantial
evidence that certain emotional states impact the immunologic, endocrine, and neurologic systems
(Ezra, Hammerman, and Shahar, 2019). The impact of emotional states on someone’s physiology
has been well-documented in conditions such as major depressive disorder (MDD), post-traumatic
stress disorder (PTSD), and various anxiety disorders (e.g., Aarons, et al., 2008). From the
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evidence I have provided, it is possible for negative emotional states associated with PMDD (e.g.,
irritability) to lead to physical changes that are described in the DSM-5 criteria, such as cognitive
dysfunction, changes in energy levels, and worsening of pre-existing chronic health conditions. As
such, it is my contention that, if certain emotional states are indeed responsible for bringing about
physiological changes associated with PMDD, then the treatment prescribed by psychologists and
psychiatrists may get to the root cause of the issue.
Physical symptoms aside, the majority of the symptoms associated with PMDD are
psychological in nature. As described by Klatzkin et al. (2010), there is little evidence to suggest
that women with PMDD exhibit hormonal differences compared to the rest of the population.
Rather, it is their emotional response to normal hormonal fluctuations that determines
symptomatology (Klatzkin et al., 2010). If women with PMDD mainly exhibit emotional
symptoms, then the profession that’s best equipped to address them are the psychological or
psychiatric fields. As such, the diagnosis of PMDD is better served as being diagnosed and treated
by mental health professionals and being listed in the DSM-5.
3. The PMDD Diagnosis May Be Harmful to Women
One of the major claims against the PMDD diagnosis highlights the problematic nature of
attributing a hormonal condition to genetic causes. By claiming that PMDD is biological, as
opposed to psychological, psychiatrists may incriminate women as being subject to what can
crudely be called “raging hormones” (Figert, 1995). Thus, labeling PMDD as stemming from a
woman’s biology could lead women to feel disempowered (Ali, Caplan, and Fagnant, 2010;
Caplan, 2013). Some critics also raised the possibility that severe premenstrual symptoms are not
biologically driven, but socially learned (Fontana and Palfai, 1994). Due stereotypes associated
with PMS as portrayed by the media, other women, and even some clinicians, certain women may
learn to associate normal premenstrual changes with negative affects (Fonta and Palfai, 1994).
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Indeed, some studies show that women who have a negative perception of their menstrual cycle are
much more likely to express symptoms consistent with PMDD than those who view their menstrual
cycles in a more positive light (Fontana and Palfai, 1994). Accordingly, the very creation of the
PMDD diagnosis may lead women to develop symptoms described by it (Watters, 2010).
The second critique of PMDD stems mainly from feminist scholars and activists who claim
that the creation of this diagnosis could increase the stigma associated with premenstrual changes,
which are experienced by all women who menstruate. As a consequence, a large segment of the
female population could experience negative social consequences (Caplan, 2015). One of such
consequences could include employment discrimination. The PMDD diagnosis, which is said to
affect up to 10% of women with a menstrual cycle, could lead some women to be labeled as
“emotionally unstable” — a claim that is technically supported by authoritative empirical evidence
(Browne, 2014; Caplan, 2015). This would not only increase employment discrimination amongst
women in general, but also effectively bar them from certain careers, such as emergency medicine
(Caplan, 2015).
The third critique of PMDD is that the diagnosis does not take into account the complex life
circumstances that lead some women to experience extreme pre-menstrual distress. Women are
more likely than men to experience certain events that can increase their susceptibility to
depression, anxiety, anger, irritability, and sadness. For instance, women are more likely than men
to experience domestic abuse, including severe forms of partner violence (Swan et al., 2008).
Women are also more likely to experience sexual assault, gender discrimination, poverty, and
violence (Abate, 2013). In addition, women who have families are more likely to take on most of
the household duties, which increases their chances of burnout, stress, anxiety, and depression
(Abate, 2013). Negative affect is a normal reaction to difficult life circumstances. However,
expressing negative emotions generally viewed as being less acceptable in women than in men
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(Caplan, 2015). Some women may become overwhelmed with normal pre-menstrual and express
emotions that are considered “abnormal” when, in fact, they are natural reactions to a difficult life
(Caplan, 2015). Some qualitative studies even show that women who meet the criteria for an
PMDD diagnosis experience distress throughout the entirety of their menstrual cycle. However, it
is only during the premenstrual phase that they express distress (Usher, Perz, and May, 2014;
Usher and Perz, 2020). Assigning some women the diagnosis of PMDD — which is viewed as
having a significant biological component — the experiences of some of these women would be
completely disregarded and the root cause of their distress left unaddressed.
While the arguments raised above bring up valid points, they do not provide a
comprehensive description of PMDD’s diagnostic effects. First, the claim that PMDD is portrayed
as having a major biological cause isn’t a critique of the diagnosis, but rather, the way that it is
described. As with most psychiatric disorders, the etiology of PMDD is part genetic, part
environmental, and part psychological. To empower women to take control of their affective states,
the solution lies in underscoring the environmental and psychological components of PMDD’s
symptoms, instead of abolishing the diagnosis entirely.
Second, the claim that being diagnosed with PMDD would increase employment
discrimination in women is not based on empirical evidence. This is supported by a recent search
on the NCBI database, which did not reveal any results for employment discrimination amongst
women with PMDD. Furthermore, employment discrimination based on someone’s medical
condition is illegal. As such, women who experience employment discrimination due to being
diagnosed with PMDD have legal recourse. Furthermore, medicalizing extreme premenstrual
distress may actually reduce stigma associated with this phenomenon. As an example, medicalizing
prolonged depressed emotional states (e.g., major depression) reduced its association with a
personal defect and provided greater accommodations in the workplace for those diagnosed with it.
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In a similar way, diagnosing women with PMDD may lead some to view women experiencing
extreme distress as suffering from a legitimate medical condition, as opposed to being described in
various disparaging ways, such as “crazy,” as described by Caplan (2015).
Finally, the claim that receiving a diagnosis of PMDD can disregard women’s experiences
may be true. If the root cause of distress lies in someone’s normal hormonal fluctuations, then it
does not stem from various environmental factors, such as domestic violence. However, this point
is not an argument against the PMDD diagnosis per se, but against the entire field of psychiatry.
The biomedical model of disease has been prevalent in psychiatry for several decades and is
responsible for the focus on hormones, neurotransmitters, and other physiological structures and
processes that aim to explain disease (Aftab, 2019). While they certainly play a role in the
development of symptoms, the role of someone’s environment, thoughts, and emotions should also
be considered in order to provide a holistic overview of a given psychiatric condition.
4. Pharmaceutical Industry Influence
Around the 1990s, the pharmaceutical industry began to take an interest in the diagnosis of
LLPDD, the precursor to PMDD. One pharmaceutical company in particular, Eli Lilly and
Company, showed an interest in the LLPDD diagnosis before the publication of the DSM-IV
because their patent for Prozac was set to expire. After lobbying the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), Eli Lilly and Company was granted an extension on their patent for Prozac, which was
rebranded Sarefem and marketed as a treatment for LLPDD/PMDD. In 2000, Serafem was
officially approved to treat LLPDD/PMDD. This was followed by the antidepressants Zoloft
(2002) and Paxil (2003), and birth control Yaz (2006). One of the main complaints brought forth
against the pharmaceutical industry was that it received FDA approval based on misleading data.
For instance, the prevalence of the disorder was highly inflated, with company-sponsored research
showing a prevalence as high as 8% in the U.S. (Perry, 2016). However, other studies show
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prevalence to be as low as 1% (Gehlert et al., 2009). According to reviews of the literature, many
studies reporting on the prevalence of PMDD do not use stringent diagnostic criteria (Gehlert et al.,
2009). As such, their estimates may include many false positives, as was the case with drugsponsored research. In addition, there is very little data to show that antidepressants marketed for
PMDD treatment are effective in reducing or eliminating symptoms in the long term (Perry, 2016).
At the same time, antidepressants marketed for PMDD are associated with various adverse effects,
which includes suicidal thoughts. These findings form the basis of another argument against
including the PMDD diagnosis in the DSM-5.
However, this argument does not directly address the issue with the PMDD diagnosis, but
rather, with its diagnosis and treatment. Even if pharmaceutical companies have an interest in
inflating PMDD prevalence and overstating the benefits of treatment, it is still possible for
individual clinicians to be cautious when diagnosing patients. In addition, antidepressants and birth
control are not the only options for treating PMDD. If side effects are a concern, alternative
treatments may be prescribed.
Conclusion
This section demonstrates the difficulty of establishing a psychiatric diagnosis and outlines
the factors that may lead to its creation. The question of whether the PMDD diagnosis should be
included or eliminated from the DSM-5 is a long-standing one. As I demonstrated, those who
believe that the diagnosis should be present in the DSM-5 claim that it is based on observable
physiological abnormalities which cause distress and disability in those who experience it.
Including the PMDD diagnosis in the DSM-5 would allow women to be diagnosed and treated for
this disorder. Those opposed to PMDD’s inclusion in the DSM-5 state that it is not a distinct
clinical entity and, even if it is, it should not be treated as a psychiatric disorder. In addition, the
consequences for women would be too great, even compared to the benefits of treatment.
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On both sides of the spectrum, the arguments about PMDD’s inclusion in the DSM-5 are
sound, which is the main reason why it took so long for the diagnosis to be officially recognized by
the American Psychiatric Association (APA). Currently, PMDD is in the main section of the DSM5 and can be used by clinicians for diagnosis and treatment. However, as with some diagnoses that
were formerly included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, it is possible that PMDD may be
removed from the main section.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
According to some scholars, psychiatric nosology is the simple description of empirical
phenomena. However, the creation of a given psychiatric diagnostic category involves a great deal
of subjectivity, influenced by personal values, goals, and knowledge. In addition, the simple act of
describing a cluster of symptoms is based on assumptions, those which may be influenced by
personal views, such as that the symptoms stem from underlying biological processes. In the case
of PMDD, the symptoms described by the diagnosis may be parts biological, environmental, and
social. However, those involved in the debate about PMDD often took a one-sided approach,
referring to a “single” cause of PMDD symptoms with differing implications for treatment.
Because of the competing interests amongst those involved in creating the PMDD
diagnosis, the decision to include it in the DSM-5 spanned several decades. There were valid and
sound arguments on both sides of the debate. In the end, the decision to include PMDD in the
DSM-5 was based on the prominence of the biomedical model of psychiatric disorder, countless
studies done on PMDD, and pressure from the pharmaceutical industry. Today, PMDD is in the
main section of the DSM-5 and can be used to diagnose and treat women who meet the diagnostic
criteria. However, as with past diagnoses, it’s possible for PMDD to one day be removed from the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual in light of new empirical evidence or philosophy on mental
disorders.
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